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This paper investigated the effect of boardroom diversity 
(herein a composite measure of boardroom ethnic 
composition, independent and foreign directors) on audit 
fees in the Nigerian context. A sample of companies 
listed on the Nigerian stock exchange between 2010 and 
2011 was used. The study found that 51% of the 
sampled companies were ethnically diverse, with about 
21% and 49% having foreign directors and independent 
directors respectively. Further, the results of the panel 
regression revealed that boardroom diversity had a 
positive relationship with audit fees. The findings 
indicate that boardroom diversity enhances board 
monitoring responsibility and therefore results in an 
increase in demand for auditors’ effort. The findings of 
this study have implications for future policy 
recommendations and formulation because they indicate 
that boardroom diversity could be a desirable board 
characteristic that can strengthen the monitoring role of 
the board.  
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independent directors, Nigeria.  
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Introduction 
The board of directors is supposedly a collection of 
individuals with heterogeneous competencies and 
capabilities pooled together to perform monitoring and 
advisory functions in a company (Walt and Ingley, 2003). 
Accordingly, the issue of what constitutes the correct mix 
of individuals and how these individuals improve board 
outcomes is of regulatory concern. The aftermath of 
each and every corporate governance failure has 
caused regulators to look inward and to see how 
boardroom composition and functions could be reformed 
to provide an effective oversight function (Ararat, Aksu 
and Cetin, 2015; Gul, Srinidhi and Tsui, 2008). This is 
critical most especially in countries where external 
monitoring mechanisms are practically non-existent and 
investors and regulators look forward to the monitoring 
role of the board of directors (Dahya, Dimitrov and 
McConnell, 2008). Most corporate governance 
regulatory requirements have laid emphasis on 
boardroom composition and demands for diversity in 
skills, knowledge and social representativeness of 
boardroom members.  
The theoretical justification behind such requirements is 
found in both the agency theory and the resources 
dependency theory. The agency theory underscores the 
importance of boardroom diversity in ensuring an 
effective and independent board monitoring function. 
Meanwhile, the resource dependency theory establishes 
the significant role played by the board of directors in 
connecting a firm with the external resources needed for 
its survival; hence, the need exists for boardroom 
structures to be a reflection of the society in which it 
operates (Walt and Ingley, 2003). As it can be deduced 
from the two theories, boardroom diversity could 
improve board processes and outcomes. This is 
because individuals have distinct intellectual and social 
traits that are best harnessed when correctly pooled 
together. Diversity can be seen as the pool of 
differences among board members with respect to 
individual inherent traits and characteristics (Kearney, 
Gebert and Voelpel, 2009). Consistent with the agency 
theory postulation, this current study aims to investigate 
the relationship between boardroom diversity and the 
intensity of demand for audit service through the amount 
paid as audit fees in Nigeria.  
As noted in Simunic’s (1980) audit production function, 
audit charges reflect the expected efforts expended 
during an audit engagement and auditor risk exposure. 
While research on audit fees is abundant, further 
investigation on their relationships with boardroom 
diversity has, to the best of our knowledge, yet to 
receive sufficient empirical attention, most especially in 
the context of Nigeria. 
Nigeria is an interesting setting in which to study board 
diversity in the context of an emerging market because 
Nigerian society is culturally diverse. Nigeria, society 
comprises more than 200 ethnic groups divided along 
three prominent groups, namely, Hausa, Yoruba and 
Igbos. This composition is differently configured than 
countries like Malaysia in which similar studies have 
been conducted. For example, Malaysian law 
recognizes two groups: Bumiputera and non-
Bumiputera. Those who are Bumiputera are known as 
“sons of the soil”, and the Bumiputera ethnic group 
(Malays) are economically and politically favoured over 
the non-Bumiputera ethnic group, which comprises the 
Chinese and Indians. Conversely, the three ethnic 
groups in Nigeria have equal rights and claims to the 
political and economic resources of the country, hence 
no ethnic group is favoured.  
Therefore, boardroom heterogeneity with respect to 
ethnicity to reflect the cultural dynamics in Nigeria 
society is imperative to promote effectiveness in 
companies (Adegbite, 2015). As noted one 
interviewee in Adegbite’s study of corporate 
governance, “boards with sufficient tribal diversity are 
considered to have better governance systems and 
will further have a sense of belonging and identity 
throughout the country” (Adegbite, 2015, p. 16). This 
observation suggests that the presence of members 
of the three ethnic groups on a board might 
contribute positively to corporate performance with 
respect to a wealth of experiences and networking. It 
would be interesting as well to see how the presence 
of these three ethnic groups affects audit quality.  
In addition, corporate governance practice as a 
“distinct concept” is of recent origin in Nigeria (Ofo, 
2013) and is still evolving. Several recent regulatory 
reforms on corporate governance in Nigeria have 
included: 
the 2003 Code of Corporate Governance in Nigeria 
(SEC Code);  
the 2006 mandatory Code of Corporate Governance 
for Nigerian Banks post consolidation (CBN Code);  
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the 2007 Code of Conduct for Shareholder 
Associations in Nigeria; and  
the National Code of Corporate Governance, which 
is currently being developed.  
The Companies and Allied Matters Act, Cap. C20, Laws 
of the Federation of Nigeria 2004 had elaborate 
provisions on the appointment, removal, duties, and 
liabilities of corporate directors but had no provisions for 
types of directors (Proshare News, 2013). Therefore, 
boardroom structural diversity is still feeble due to 
insufficient capacities and the lack of independent 
directors on boards (Adegbite, 2015).  
Moreover, corporate ownership has passed through 
various regulatory reforms among which are the 1962 
Foreign Exchange Control Act, 1972 Indigenity Policy, 
and the 1988 Privatization and Commercial Policy 
(Ahunwan, 2002). All these policies have implications for 
corporate governance practices. Similarly, findings of 
previous studies show that the traditional role and 
overbearing influence of family ownership has impacts 
on board process (see also Klein, Shapiro and Young, 
2004; MacAvoy and Millstein, 2003). Accordingly, 
agency challenges emerging from the ownership 
structure in Nigeria compared with other English-
speaking countries tend to expropriate minority interests 
(Adegbite and Nakajima, 2011).  
Therefore, investigating how a composite measure of 
boardroom diversity cushions the effect of the agency 
problem in Nigeria context is interesting. Using a sample 
of firms from 2010 to 2011, evidence is provided 
supporting the theoretical preposition that board diversity 
enhances the board’s monitoring role as it creates room 
for more independence in the boardroom. Specifically, 
we show that the extent of boardroom diversity is 
associated with the demand for more audit effort 
expressed by audit fees. Similarly, we test individual 
diversity proxies, and our findings reveal that all the 
three proxies exhibit a positive relationship, however 
only with the proportion of foreign directors in the 
boardroom. Our findings provide insights to regulators 
and investors on how corporate structure and operating 
results affect audit pricing. Therefore, the study extends 
and contributes to the body of knowledge in corporate 
governance and audit fee literature by using data from a 
less regulated environment.  
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. 
Section 1 provides a literature review and the hypothesis 
for the study. Data and method of sampling are 
discussed in Section 2, and the research 
design/methodology in Section 3. The results and the 
analysis are discussed in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 
includes a summary of our findings, implications and 
limitations of our findings, and suggestions for future 
studies.  
1. Literature review and 
hypotheses development 
Numerous studies have examined the relationships 
between board characteristics and board process 
outcomes such as firm performance (Amran and Ahmad, 
2010; Ramdani and Witteloostuijn, 2010), value 
relevance of earnings (Carter, Simkins, and Simpson, 
2003), and earnings quality and the intensity of demand 
for audit service via audit pricing (Carcello, Hermanson, 
Neal and Riley, 2002; Ahmad, Houghton and Yusof, 
2006; Ahmad and Mansor, 2009). Extant studies on 
audit pricing starting from the seminal work of Simunic 
(1980) have pointed out client-related factors such as 
auditee size, auditee complexity, and auditee riskiness 
as important variables that influence the amount paid as 
audit fees in different regulatory and institutional 
contexts. Examples of such studies include Carcello et 
al. (2002), Abbott et al. (2003) and Boo and Sharma 
(2008) in the United States, Vafeas and Waegelein 
(2007) and Zaman, Hudaib and Haniffa (2011) in the 
United Kingdom, and Goodwin-Stewart and Kent (2006) 
and Stewart and Munro (2007) in Australia.  
Further, other studies on the intensity of audit demand 
have established a relationship between board 
characteristics and audit pricing. The argument has 
been made that an independent and diligent board will 
demand a high quality audit service due to the incentive 
to protect board reputational capital, reduce board 
litigation risks and safeguard shareholder interests 
(Fama and Jensen, 1983; Gilson, 1990). The theoretical 
justification underlying this relationship is in line with 
Fama and Jensen’s (1983) argument that independent 
directors have the incentive to monitor management due 
to their reputation; hence, independent directors are 
effective in disciplining management. Consistent with 
Fama and Jensen’s (1983) theoretical postulation, 
Armstrong, Core and Guay (2014) reported that firms 
with a high number of independent directors are more 
transparent. Goodwin-Stewart and Kent (2006) found 
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that an audit committee with independent characteristics 
increase audit effort and audit fees. In their study, Mitra, 
Hossain and Deis (2007) documented a positive 
relationship between bulk institutional stock ownership 
and audit fees, while Carcello et al. (2002) reported that 
independent directors demand high quality audits as 
reflected in the amount paid as audit fees by an auditee.  
Lately, academic researchers have recognized the 
influence of resource-rich composed boards of directors 
in providing critical resources needed by their firms 
(Hillman, Withers and Collins, 2009). The resource 
dependency theory acknowledges the interdependency 
between an organization and its environment (Pfeffer, 
1972). In order to succeed, managers act in manners 
that minimize such dependencies when they constitute a 
threat or gain from them when they create opportunities.  
Hence, the presence of foreigners on the corporate 
board could be argued as enhancing board competency 
by virtue of their foreign exposure in terms of skills, 
knowledge, values, norms, and understanding (Ruigrok, 
Peck and Tacheva, 2007). Ruigrok, Peck and Tacheva 
(2007) posited that foreign directors are not connected 
with closed domestic networks and are independent 
from management. Their presence on the board signals 
to investors, most especially minority foreign investors, 
that the firm is professionally managed and their rights 
are safeguarded (Oxelheim and Randøy, 2002). 
Consequently, the presence of foreigners on the board 
might necessitate the demand for a high quality audit. As 
mentioned earlier, foreign directors tend to have different 
exposure to governance practices and are bound to 
import their foreign ideas into the way local companies 
are managed. This makes the board demand for an 
expanded audit scope grow in order to protect their 
reputational capital.  
Similarly, from another perspective, several studies have 
investigated the influence of gender and ethnicity of 
directors on audit outcome. Studies on gender and 
ethnicity diversity have noted variations in individual 
traits dictated by gender and ethnic groups of 
individuals, which can affect decision-making process in 
the organisation. For instance, by their nature, females 
have been observed to be more risk averse and more 
independent-minded compared to their male 
counterparts. Accordingly, females exhibit a high level of 
monitoring intensity. Gul, Srinidhi and Tsui (2008) 
examined the association between female directors 
(proxy for board diversity) and audit fees, using a 
sample of firms in the United States from 2001 to 2003. 
The authors reported that boards with a higher 
proportion of female directors in the boardroom demand 
more in terms of audits; thus, high audit fees are 
consistent with the agency theory.  
Other studies like those of Yatim, Kent and Clarkson 
(2006) and Johl, Subramaniam and Zain (2006) of 
Malaysia have observed board ethnic diversity effects on 
audit fees and all provided supporting evidence that the 
ethnic composition of the board impacts audit fees. 
Watson, Kumar and Michaelsen (1993) argued that 
culturally diverse group are assets through which group 
process and solutions to problem are achieved. To 
strengthen the argument, Baer, Niessen-Ruenzi and 
Ruenzi (2007), based on the information and decision-
making theory, argued that team members are part of a 
different network and this enhances group knowledge 
and skills. Implicitly, team members have information 
from different sources, which helps to improve their 
performance. However, the social diversity theory 
maintained that ethnic diversity among team members 
could generate conflicts due to information asymmetry, 
lower satisfaction, and low commitment among 
members. Ahmad, Houghton and Yusof (2006) 
investigated the extent to which board ethnic 
associations affect the market for audit services in 
Malaysia. The authors established a significant 
relationship between ethnic associations of the board of 
directors and the choice of auditor.  
Apart from the fact that the above studies were 
conducted in developed countries, empirical findings 
from these studies have been inconsistent (Felix, 
Gramling and Maletta, 2001; Godwin-Stewart and Kent, 
2006; Vafeas and Waegelein, 2007). Although quite a 
number of studies examined board structure diversity 
(independent directors) and demographic diversity 
(director’s ethnicity, nationality and gender diversity), 
these studies only used a single proxy and the findings 
of the studies mostly cannot be generalized or extended 
to other contexts. In addition, investigations of 
performance outcomes of single demographic and 
structural diversity attributes, respectively, are equivocal 
(Ararat, Aksu and Cetin, 2015).  
Therefore, the current paper extends this area of 
research by developing a composite index of board 
diversity measure using Blau’s (1977) measure of 
variety and investigating its effects on the intensity of 
audit demand in Nigeria. Board diversity is 
Boardroom diversity and audit fees: director ethnicity, independence and nationality         
No. 4(136)/2016 417
operationalized by combining different diversity 
indicators compared to the single constructs used in 
prior studies. We argue that much insight into the 
studied phenomenon could be gained by integrating 
these different diversity indicators. In furtherance of the 
above conjectures, this study posits that: 
H: Boardroom diversity (herein operationalised by 
combining difference diversity indicators) will lead to a 
higher demand for audit effort and a corresponding 
increase in audit fees. 
2. Data and method of sampling 
The sample includes all public listed firms on the 
Nigerian Stock Exchange with annual reports 
available online. Poor record keeping and the 
absence of data banks have bedevilled accounting 
research in Nigeria. Most often older copies of 
annual reports were burnt to create space for new 
ones. Records were found for of 213 and 218 listed 
companies in 2010 and 2011 respectively, but after 
excluding all financial institutions, the researchers 
were left with 123 annual report observations for 
firms. This included 65 annual reports for 2010 and 
58 annual reports for 2011. The sampling process is 
shown in Table 1. The mandatory changes in 
reporting and auditing requirements at the end of 
2010 informed the choice of the study period. First, 
the new corporate governance code issued by the 
Nigeria Security and Exchange Commission in 2011 
was supposed to be voluntarily adopted by all listed 
companies by April 2011. In addition, the federal 
reporting council vested with the responsibility of 
ensuring transparency and appropriate disclosure 
practices, was established in 2011 too. Second, all 
listed companies were to adopt the International 
Financial Reporting Standards by the end of 2012 
and 2011 precedes the year of adoption.  
 
Table 1. Sample collection procedure 
Year 
Total listed  
companies 
Banks and other  
financial institutions 
Not available 
 online and NSE 
Final  
sample 
2010 213 81 67 65 
2011 218 71 89 58 
Sum 431 152 156 123 
Source: Authors’ compilation, 2016 
 
3. Research design and variable 
measurements  
Based on the theoretical framework and the hypothesis 
that was developed, the conceptual model of auditing 
pricing introduced by Simunic (1980) as extended by 
Chan, Ezzamel and Gwilliam (1993) and Boo and 
Sharma (2008) was adopted in this study. A panel data 
regression model was used to examine the relationship 
between boardroom diversity and audit fees along with 
firm specific variables to control for company size, 
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Table 2. Variable description 
Variable Description 
FEE Natural logarithms of audit fees. 
TBD Composite measure of board dynamics. 
FOR The number of foreign directors in boardroom divided by board size. 
ETHNIC A dummy variable set to 1 for companies whose board is made up of the three ethnic groups and 0 if otherwise. 
INDP Percentage of independent directors on the board.
BLKSHR The percentage of shares held by individual investors above 5 percent. 
MGROWN Percentage of shares held by directors
RISKCOM A dummy variable set to 1 for companies that establish risk management committee. 
CORPCOM A dummy variable set to 1 for companies that establish corporate governance committee. 
LOGTO Natural logarithms of total assets.
RITA Ratio of inventory to total assets. 
GEARING Long term debt divided by total assets
BIG4 A dummy variable set to 1 for companies audited by any of the Big4 audit firm and 0 if otherwise.  
NOSUB Number of subsidiaries plus one.
 Error term.  
Source: Authors’ compilation, 2016 
 
4. Results of the analysis 
4.1. Preliminary analysis 
Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics for the full 
sample of 123 observations for the firms that were 
employed to run the audit fees model. The table 
presents the mean, minimum, maximum, and 
standard deviation values. As shown in Table 3, 
the audit fees for the sampled companies ranged 
between 400,000 Naira and 135,000,000 Naira 
(foreign exchange rate is 165 Naira for 1 dollar), 
and foreign-owned companies represented by FOR 
had a mean value of 0.21%, the mean value for 
boardroom ETHNIC representation was 0.51% and 
INDP mean value was 0.49%. The value for 
individual concentrated ownership (BLKSHR) 
ranged between 0.05% and 0.99% and the 
maximum value of managerial ownership 
(MGROWN) was 3.79%. The results also showed 
that RISKCOM and CORPCOM had mean values 
of 36% and 28% respectively, indicating that less 
than half of the sampled companies had 
established a risk management committee and a 
corporate governance committee. The mean 
number of foreign directors on the board was 21%. 
 
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics of Dependent and Control Variables 
Variable Observations Mean Standard deviation Minim Maxim 
FEE 123 14,600,000 20,400,000 400,000 135,000,000
TBD 123 0.47 0.31 0.0 1.18
FOR 123 0.21 0.24 0 0.89
ETHNIC 123 0.51 0.50 0 1
INDP 123 0.49 0.28 0 1
BLKSHR 123 0.56 0.21 0.05 0.99
MGROWN 123 0.14 0.38 0 3.79
RISKCOM 123 0.36 0.48 0 1
CORPCOM 123 0.28 0.45 0 1
LOGTO 123 9.73 0.81 7.51 11.38
RITA 123 0.89 4.88 0 54.14
GEARING 123 10.76 18.52 0 122.37
BIG4 123 0.62 0.49 0 1
NOSUB 123 2.93 2.92 0 14
Source: Authors’ compilation, 2016 
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4.2. Tests for random and fixed effects 
regression  
The choice between random and fixed effects was 
based on the Hausman test (Green, 1997). In order to 
choose the appropriate model, the Hausman test was 
run because the Hausman test checks whether the 
errors (Ui) are correlated with the regressors. If pro > 
chi2 is < 0.05 (i.e., significant) the fixed effect model is 
used (Greene, 1997). The Hausman test shows a 
probability greater than 0.05, so the null hypothesis was 
rejected; hence, the random effects model is appropriate 
for the study. By implication, the individual error 
component is not correlated with the regression 
variabiles, thus OLS estimator is consistent.  
4.3. Results of model 
Table 4 presents the generalist square random regression 
results. A good linear fit was achieved with an adjusted R2 
of 64%. This suggests that the model explains more than 
of the 60% variation between the dependent variable and 
the independent variable. The regression coefficient for the 
composite measure of board dynamics (TBD) in model 1 
was positive and significant in predicting the amount paid 
as audit fees by Nigerian publicly listed companies. The 
finding is consistent with the agency theory, which states 
that an effective board will be more thorough in their 
monitoring role and therefore will make more demands in 
an audit engagement. Next, the regression coefficient for 
nationality of members of the board of director (FOR) in 
model 2 was positive and significant indicating that in order 
to be more transparent, foreign directors will pay more for 
audit services to ensure the credibility of financial 
statements and protect the reputations of the directors 
(Ahmad, Houghton and Yusof, 2006). In model three, the 
coefficient of boardroom ethnic balance (ETHNIC), which 
indicates the presence of the three prominent ethic groups 
in Nigeria in the boardroom, the coefficient was positive 
although not significant. Lastly, in model 4, the coefficient 
for the percentage of independent directors (INDP) was 
positive but not significant. 
 
Table 4. Regression Model 





































































































F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Mean Vif   2.32
Adjusted Rs 64 60 60 60 
Notes: * = significant at 10%, ** = significant at 5% and *** = significant at 1% 
Source: Authors’ compilation, 2016 
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Across the three models the coefficient of individual 
block shareholders (BLKSHR) was positive and 
significant, although in model 2 the coefficient was not 
significant. The coefficient of managerial ownership was 
significant and negative across the three models. With 
respect to board risk committee (RISKCOM), the 
coefficient was negative and significant in the three 
models, and, for the corporate governance committee 
(CORPCOM), the coefficient was positive and significant 
in all the three models. In addition, and consistent with 
prior literature, firm-specific control variables such as 
client size proxy by log of turnover (LOGTO), client 
complexity proxy by number of subsidiaries (SUB) and 
the ratio of inventory to total assets (RITA) and client risk 
proxy by long term debt to total assets (GEARING) were 
all significant and in line with the findings of prior studies. 
Likewise, the coefficient of the proxy for Big4 auditors for 
auditor characteristics (BIG4) was positive and 
significant in all the three models.  
Conclusion  
Factors determining auditors’ fees have been of great 
interest owning to the likely threat of high fees to 
auditors’ independence. Similarly, boardroom diversity is 
widely being touted with the claim that it improves the 
oversight function of the board of directors. To examine 
such issues in the context of Nigeria, this study looked at 
the effect of boardroom diversity on audit demand 
expressed by audit fees. Overall, the paper contributes 
to the investigation on the diversity-audit demand 
relationship by showing that multiple diversity attributes 
have a compound effect on the extent of audit demand. 
The results found that the total board diversity (TBD) 
index developed in this study impacted the demand of 
the board of directors for audit services more 
significantly than the individual diversity attributes as 
TBD enhanced audit demand. This finding is consistent 
with theoretical justification that boardroom diversity 
improves the monitoring function of the board of 
directors because the board will likely comprise 
individuals with independent minds (Walt and Ingley, 
2003). According to Carcello et al. (2002) and Knechel 
and Willekens (2006), independent and diligent board of 
directors will demand high-quality audit services to 
safeguard their reputations and avoid litigation risks 
arising from non-performance.  
The current study’s finding reflecting the Nigeria context 
may provide more relevant and interesting conclusions 
for emerging markets that exhibit similar corporate 
governance features most especially in countries with 
type two agency problems and with weak 
implementation and enforcement mechanisms. Based 
on this study, regulators could consider improving 
boardroom diversity, most especially with respect to the 
individual diversity features examined, would be an 
excellent measure to improve the effectiveness of 
boards of directors in Nigeria.  
Like any other empirical study of this nature, this 
research is imperfect and has limitations requiring that 
the findings be interpreted within the purview of the 
highlighted limitations. The first limitation arises from the 
limited generalizability of the study. This is due to the 
small sample size and single country context that was 
necessitated due to the hand collection of data, the 
availability of data at the time of data collection and the 
need to control for institution differences in the sample. 
In addition, the present study excludes banks and other 
financial institutions due to their reporting structures. To 
this extent, the results of the sample may suffer from 
sample bias. Although the sample is a replica of many 
other emerging markets, future studies could use 
longitudinal data and adapt the model used in this 
current study to provide more robust findings.  
Second, contextual variables capturing corporate 
governance practices in Nigeria that are distinct from 
what are obtainable anywhere else should be introduced 
in future studies on audit pricing in Nigeria. Probably, 
such variables could serve to explain the variations in 
audit fees better within the Nigerian context. Such 
variables could emanate from ownership structure types 
in the country or the dominance of one ethnic group in 
the board structure, if possible, in line with the risk 
averseness and business shrewdness of each ethnic 
group. Similarly, future studies could capture the overall 
effects of regulatory changes in the Nigerian financial 
reporting architecture and investigate how these affect 
the audit market as a whole.   
Third, non-audit fees are lumped together with audit fees 
in the annual reports and consequently the study used 
auditor’s remuneration. However, the study does not 
expect non-separate disclosure of these fees to affect 
the findings of the study because it is less relevant in 
Nigeria.  
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Lastly, consistent with resource dependency theory, 
future studies within this regulatory setting could 
examine the impact of networking of politically 
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